Criminal Procedure - Discovery - Statements of Co-Defendants in Federal Courts - United States v. Edwards 42 F.R.D. 605 (S.D.N .Y. 1967) by Horne, Thomas D.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 19
Criminal Procedure - Discovery - Statements of
Co-Defendants in Federal Courts - United States v.
Edwards 42 F.R.D. 605 (S.D.N .Y. 1967)
Thomas D. Horne
Copyright c 1968 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Thomas D. Horne, Criminal Procedure - Discovery - Statements of Co-Defendants in Federal Courts -
United States v. Edwards 42 F.R.D. 605 (S.D.N .Y. 1967), 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 250 (1968),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss1/19
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Levy v. Louisiana, in extending the Equal Protection Clause to il-
legitimate children in cases involving the wrongful death of their
mothers, recognizes that the law cannot discriminate against an indi-
vidual where he has performed no illegal act 2l and where his demeanor
bears no relevant relationship to the wrong committed.
Whether or not the scope of the decision is limited only to the
mother-child relationship in wrongful death actions is yet to be de-
termined.2 2 However, the broad language employed by the court indi-
cates that any such distinction based on illegitimacy may well be vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, at
least where close family relations are involved.
ROBERT KAHN
Criminal Procedure-DiscovERY oF CO-DEFENDANTS IN FEDERAL
CouRTs. In United States v. Edwards,' the defendant was charged with
interstate transportation of stolen securities in violation of Federal Law.2
Defendant moved, inter alia, for the discovery of ". . . all statements
of his co-defendants . . . referring to him. . . ." The court denied
the motion, basing its decision on the defendant's .. . failure to show
materiality and reasonableness (emphasis supplied) as required by Rule
16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 The court further
pointed out that
The entire tenor of Rule 16 is contrary to the production
of such statements. No exception need be made where the movant
believes they may support a possible motion for severance under
Powell, 67 Ga. App. 460, 21 S.E.2d ill (1942); Hiser v. Davis, 234 N.Y. 300, 137
N.E. 596 (1922); Molz v. Hansell, 115 Pa. Super. 338, 175 A. 880 (1934); Sesostris
Youchican v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551 (1920); Washington B. &
A.R. Co. v. States, 136 Md. 103, 111 A. 164 (1920); Good v. Towns, 56 Vt. 410, 48
Am. R. 799 (1883). But see Frazier v. Oil Chemical Co., 407 Pa. 78, 179 A.2d 202
(1962); Battalico v. Knickerbocker Fireproofing Co., 294 N.Y.S. 481, 250 App. Div.
258 (1937); Barron v. Zimmerman, 117 Md. 296, 83 A. 258 (1912).
21. Justice Douglas stated:
We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not "nonper-
sons." They are humans, live and have their being. They are clearly
"persons" within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 88 S.Ct. at -.
22. This question constituted the principal basis for the dissent.
1. 42 F.R.D. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1964).




Rule 14, F.R. Crim. P., since the latter rule expressly provides
that on a motion for severance, the court may direct the prose-
cutor to furnish it for in camera inspection with any state-
ments of co-defendants which the Government intends to use at
trial.5
Prior to the adoption of Rule 16(b)," statements of co-defendants
were held to be not subject to discovery by individual defendants un-
der the Federal Rules. 7 Because of the failure to make specific reference
to statements of co-defendants in the 1966 revisions to the Rules,
doubts were raised as to whether such statements would now be avail-
able, in view of their prior history of unobtainability.8 Commentators
on the revisions took note of this omission, the relative factors favor-
ing and disfavoring inclusion based on wording within the section,
and, also the relationship of Rule 16(b) to Rule 1410 governing relief
5. Id. at 606-07.
6. Fm. R. CRIM. P. 16(b), 18 U.S.C. 16(b) (1966).
(b) Other books, papers, documents, tangible objects or places.
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for
the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photo-
graph books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, or
copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or
control of the government, upon a showing of materiality to the prepa-
ration of his defense and that the request is reasonable. Except as pro-
vided in subdivision (a) (2), this rule does not authorize the discovery or
inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government docu-
ments made by government agents in connection with the investigation
or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by government wit-
nesses or prospective government witnesses (other than the defendant)
to agents of the government except as provided in 18 U.S.C. 3500.
7. E.g., United States v. Kenner, 36 F.R.D. 391 (D.C.N.Y. 1965); United States v.
Hughes, 195 F. Supp. 795 (D.C.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Faucher, 195 F. Supp.
448 (D.C. Conn. 1961); United States v. Bentvena, 193 F. Supp. 485 (D.C. N.Y. 1960).
8. See Fm. R. CruM. P. 16(b), 18 U.S.C. 16(b) (1966); Advisory Committee's Note,
39F.R.D. 69, 175-78 (1966).
9. Compare Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo. L. J.
1276 (1966), with Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 1964 DuKt L.J. 477 (1964).
10. FE. R. CraM. P. 14, 18 U.S.C. 14 (1966).
Relief from Prejudicial Joinder. If it appears that a defendant or the
government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in
an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the
court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a sev-
erance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order
the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection,
in camera any statements or confessions made by defendants which the
government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.
1968]
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from prejudicial jointure. When examined in light of this commentary
and "the [Supreme] Court's general attitude toward broader discovery
in criminal cases," " the holding in Edwards and other recent decisions 12
(supporting, by implication, disclosure of co-defendants' statements)
can be better understood.
The exclusive quality of Rules 14 and 16, referred to in Edwards,13
has been commented upon as follows:
No negative implication for discovery can be properly drawn
from the amendment to rule 14 which authorizes the court in
ruling on a severance motion to order the prosecutor to de-
liver to the court for in camera inspection any statements of
defendants he intends to introduce at the trial. This provision
simply assures judicial access to such statements to facilitate
the determination of whether prejudice may result in a multi-
ple defendant trial from the introduction of statements not ad-
missible against all the defendants. This provision is not directed to
the problem of whether, and under what circumstances, direct
defense access to such statements shall be allowed. 14
Thus, while such statements remain independent of inspection under
a motion for severance, their discovery is nonetheless restricted by
the requirements of "materiality" and "reasonableness" of Rule 16(b)
and the criteria of the Jencks Act,15 which governs use of statements of
Government witnesses.
Concerning the latter, the court in United States v. Gleason'6 struck
11. United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.RD. 419, 422 (S.D. Ind. 1967) See FM
R. CruM. P., 18 U.S.C.A. 16(b) (1966) (explanatory note).
The extent to which pretrial discovery should be permitted in criminal
cases is a complex and controversial issue. The problems have been ex-
plored in detail in recent legal literature, most of which has been in
favor of increasing the range of permissable discovery.
12. United States v. Wallace, 272 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v.
Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419 (S.D. Ind. 1967); Cf. United States v. Turner, 274 F.
Supp. 412 (ED. Tenn. 1967).
13. 42 F.R.D. 605, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
14. Rezneck, supra note 9, at 1284-85, at n. 32.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). "Demands for production of statements and reports
of witnesses." The Jencks Act is aimed at the non-discoverability of a government
witness' statement until after the direct testimony of the witness is given at trial. For
a discussion of the Jeincks Act within the general purview of criminal discovery, see,
e.g., Louisell, Criminal Discovery, 49 CALF. L. REv. 56, 73-74 (1961); Krantz, Pre-
trial Discovery in Criminal Cases; A Necessity for Fair and Impartial Justice, 42 Nm.
L. REv. 127, 143-144 (1962).
16. 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Income tax evasion).
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a balance between the due process requirement of disclosure of evi-
dence favorable to the defendant 17 and the requirements of Rule 16
(b) protecting the "work product" of the prosecution and statements
of a co-defendant from whom a severance had been granted. (In the
latter instance, the defendant who is prosecuted first becomes a po-
tential government witness, whose statements would then fall under
the Jencks exclusion.)' S Choosing to examine the statements in cam-
era, the Gleason Court denied their discovery on grounds they were
not "novel" or "unexpected." 19
Based on facts similar to the Edwards case,20 United States v. West-
moreland2 and United States v. Wallace22 have each implied that (1)
statements of co-defendants are subject to discovery under 16(b), ab-
sent the granting of a severance under Rule 14; and (2) the test as
to whether such statements will be made available for discovery by a
defendant is (at the discretion of the court) based upon the "reasonable-
ness" and "materiality" of the request2s
Though clearly representing an abrupt departure from previously
strict discovery rules, the impact of the holding in Edwards and its
concomitant decisions is limited by the fact that in each instance the
case was decided adversely to the defendant, thus failing to afford any
clear definition of what is "reasonable" and "material" in a given situ-
ation.24 It is upon this point that future court decisions must dwell in
order more clearly to define the limits of Rule 16(b) and what is re-
quired of a movant thereunder. THOMAS D. HoRNcE
17. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
18. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), on the origin of the "work prod-
uct" doctrine.
19. United States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
20. The facts were similar here in their relationship to the discovery motion.
21. 41 F.R.D. 419 (S.D. Ind. 1967) (violation of Internal Revenue Code).
22. 272 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (receipt and possession of stolen money).
23. The decision in Edwards appears to refute the argument that all items in pos-
session of the government must be material (or else the government would not
bother to have them); or that pretrial statements of one with such intimate connec-
tion with the case as to be joined as a co-defendant are in themselves material and
that under such circumstances a request for their production would prima face
be reasonable. See 8 R. Cra's, MooRz's FEDERAL PRACIcE, 16-12 (1966); Everett, supra
note 9, at 507-08; Rezneck, supra note 9, at 1279; G. SmDOAN (ed.), LAw AND TAc-
• cs IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES, 130-31 (1964).
24. See 2 L. ORcIELD, CaImNAL PROCEURE UNDER Tm FEDERAL RUtES, 538-39 (1966).
Though written in light of former Rule 16, the author's conclusion that, "the ques-
tion of reasonableness may not be decided in the abstract, for what would be rea-
sonable in one case might not be in another," seems to best summarize the problem
that now faces the courts. See cases cited therein.
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